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RECENT DECISIONS
Labor Law-Scope of Remedy: Despite a party's continued refusal
to bargain in good faith with reference to a particular substantive pro-
vision of a collective bargaining contract, the United States Supreme
Court has held, in H. K. Porter Co. v. N.L.R.B., 1 that the Board is
without power to devise a remedy which would compel the violator to
agree to that provision.
In this particular case, the employees' bargaining agent, the
United States Steelworkers' Union, sought to procure a clause pro-
viding for the check-off of union dues. Although it had no general
policy against a dues check-off and admitted that such procedure,
being already utilized at some other plants, would cause it no in-
convenience, the company adamantly refused to grant such a pro-
vision for the reason that it "did not wish to give aid and comfort to
the Union."'2 The Trial Examiner, whose findings and conclusions
were adopted by the National Labor Relations Board, concluded
that the employer had failed to bargain in good faith, its refusal
to grant a check-off being solely "for the purpose of frustrating
agreement with the Union."3 The Board's standard order requiring
the company to bargain in good faith on the check-off issue was
upheld by the Court of Appeals in an opinion which intimated that
the Board might devise a remedy requiring the company to accept
the disputed clause in order to purge itself of its prior bad faith.4
As a result of the confusion generated by the opinion's ambiguity
and the divergent interpretations given it by the Board, the com-
pany and the union,5 the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in
clarification of that which it had previously handed down. 6 In
clarifying its position, the Court of Appeals expressed the opinion
that when (a) the subject of the dispute is a mandatory subject of
bargaining, (b) an impasse is reached, (c) the impasse results from
bad faith on the part of one who has no "business reason" for
maintaining its stance, and (d) the violator has "unmistakably
demonstrated a continuing intent to frustrate the Act," the Board
1397 U.S. 99 (1970).
2 H. K. Porter Co., Inc., AFL-CIO, 153 N.L.R.B. 1370, 1373.3Id. at 1372.
4 United Steelworkers of America v. N.L.R.B. 363 F.2d 272 (1966).
5 The company interpreted the decree as another order that it bargain in good
faith and, thus, proposed to discuss the possibility of making available to the
union a table in the payroll office. The union, on the other hand, interpreted
the decree as an order requiring the company to both agree to the check-off
provision and allow the union to collect dues during non-working hours in
non-working areas of the plant. The Board, accepting the company's inter-
pretation, ordered the company to bargain with the union as to some form
of dues collection. United Steelworkers of America, v. N.L.R.B., 389 F.2d
295, 297-298 (1967).6 United Steelworkers of America v. N.L.R.B., 389 F.2d 295 (1967).
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is justified in compelling the violator to agree to the disputed
clause.7
Acting without benefit of a clear definition of the precise scope
of Section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act,8 the Court of
Appeals interpreted that section as a guide to be used in determin-
ing whether a violation has occurred and not as a limitation upon
the scope of remedy the Board may devise. Thus, reasoned the
Court, since that section does not relate to the scope of remedy, the
provision that the obligation to bargain collectively "does not com-
pel either party to agree to a proposal" would not prohibit the
Board from compelling the recalcitrant employer to agree to the
check-off. such compulsion would not preclude the violator from
seeking a concession in return, but would merely prevent it from
"dreaming up new reasons" for opposition to the clause after its
prior bad faith with reference thereto has been determined. Only
in this manner, concluded the Court, might a party's ability to
frustrate the purposes of the Act be circumscribed. 10
Recognizing the desirability of devising a remedy which would
prevent circumvention of the Act, the United States Supreme
Court nevertheless considered the Board's action in compelling
agreement to be an overextension of the powers conferred upon
that agency' and an act in direct contravention of Section 8(d).
Interpreting that section as both a guide and a limitation, the Court
pointed out the anomaly that would exist should 8(d) be viewed
as precluding the Board from finding bad faith in mere failure to
reach agreement on a particular proposal while permitting the
Board to compel agreement in that same dispute.12
Id. at 299, 301.
s The pertinent provisions of this Act read as follows:
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the perform-
ance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative
of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith
... but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a pro-
posal or require the making of a concession .... 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(d).
That this section had never been clearly defined so as to provide for a ready
solution to the problem presented in this case was recognized by the Supreme
Court:
"... [T]his is the first time in the 35-year history of the Act that the
Board has ordered either an employer or a union to agree to a sub-
stantive term of a collective-bargaining agreement." H. K. Porter v.
N.L.R.B., 397 U.S. 99, 106 (1970).
0 389 F.2d 295, 299.1l Id.
"i That the Court would so hold any balancing of broad policy interests by the
Board a usurpation of power was predictable in view of its previous state-
ment:
"[W]e think that the Board construes its functions too expansively
when it claims general authority to define national labor policy by bal-
ancing the competing interests of labor and management." American
Ship Building Co. v. N.L.R.B., 380 U.S. 300, 316 (1965).
12397 U.S. at 107, 108.
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Although the Court had never before been so explicit with
reference to the scope of that section, its present position was pre-
dictable in view of its prior holdings to the effect that Section
8(d) "contains the express provision that the obligation to bargain
collectively does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or
require the making of a concession," and, thus, "the Board may not,
either directly or indirectly, compel concessions or otherwise sit in
judgment upon the substantive terms of collective bargaining
agreements.' 3 Hence, the present holding:
[W]hile the Board does have power . . . to require employ-
ers and employees to negotiate, it is without power to com-
pel a company or a union to agree to any substantive
contractual provision of a collective bargaining agreement.14
That the Act is built upon the basic premise of noninterference
with substantive terms of a collective bargaining contract is quite
clear; Congressional debates held while considering passage of the
National Labor Relations Act attest to that fact.' 5 Further reflecting
the intention that this premise not be forgotten are expressions of
Congressional leaders who, seeking to amend the National Labor
Relations Act, succeeded in obtaining passage of the Taft-Hartley Act.' 6
13N.L.R.B. v. American Nat. Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 404 (1951). Further re-
flecting its attitude toward governmental interference with substantive terms
of collective bargaining agreements, the Court has stated:
Congress intended that the parties should have wide latitude in
their negotiations, unrestricted by any governmental power to regulate
the substantive solution of their differences." N.L.R.B. v. Insurance
Agents' Int'l., 361 U.S. 477, 488 (1960).
See also, Terminal R.R. Ass'n. v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 318
U.S. 1, 6 (1943) and N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1,
45 (1937).
14 397 U.S. at 102.
15 Senator Walsh, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Education and Labor,
in debate on the bill that became the N.L.R.A., commented:
[T]he bill requires no employer to sign any contract, to make any
agreement, to reach any understanding with any employee or group of
employees .... All employers are left free in the future as in the past
to accept whatever terms they choose. . . . It anticipates that the em-
ployer will deal reasonably with the employees, that he will be patient,
but he is obliged to sign no agreement; he can say, "Gentlemen, we
have heard you and considered your proposals. We cannot comply with
your request"; and that ends it. 79 Cong. Rec. 7659, 7660 (1935).
16 In his report accompanying the bill which became the Taft-Hartley Act, Mr.
Hartley, of the House Committee on Education & Labor, described the plight
of the employer, subjected to ever-expanding governmental interference, as
follows:
. . . He has been required to employ or reinstate individuals who have
destroyed his property and assaulted other employees .... He has seen
the loyalty of supervisors undermined by the compulsory unionism im-
posed upon them by the National Labor Relations Board. He has been
required by law to bargain over matters to which it is economically
impossible for him to accede, and when he has refused to accede has
been accused of failing to bargain in good faith. . . . H. R. Rep. No.
245, 80th Cong.,lst Sess. 4-5.
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In recognition of and with deference to this intent, the
Supreme Court, since first upholding the constitutionality of the
N.L.R.A., 17 has consistently forwarded the policy of freedom of
contract.18 As one writer has put it, the courts have "leaned back-
ward in a conscious effort to provide the maximum of freedom
to the parties." 19
Regardless of its intentions, however, the question remains: Has
the Court actually been able to maintain this position of non-inter-
ference-or have difficulties encountered in attempting to effectuate
the policies of the Act compelled intervention with labor negotia-
tions? And will the problems posed by the Court of Appeals neces-
sitate future intervention in the area of substantive terms of labor
contracts?
A definite trend toward governmental intervention in the collec-
tive bargaining process has already been established. The courts
have dictated which subjects must be submitted to bargaining 20
and which ones must be kept out when met with objection.21 Em-
ployers have been ordered to bargain with unions whose majority
status has been doubtful 22 and to reinstate workers with back pay
following unfair labor practice strikes.23 Although these measures
do not constitute interference with substantive terms, they do indi-
cate the necessity of restrictions upon freedom of contract. It has been
argued that the enforcement of reasonable behavior has already in-
directly resulted in control over the substantive terms of labor contracts,
and that the government, through deciding what constitutes good-faith
bargaining and enforcing that which it considers reasonable behavior,
has already made an "extensive sacrifice of freedom of contract." 24 As
Professor Cox put it:
[T]he law has crossed the threshold into the conference room
and now looks over the negotiator's shoulder. Is the next
step to take a seat at the bargaining table ?25
In view of this development, he warned:
[U]nless Congress writes into the law guides for the Board to follow,
the Board may . . . seek to control more and more the terms of col-
lective-bargaining agreements. Id. at 20.
17 N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
18 See Terminal R.R. Ass'n. v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1
(1943); N.L.R.B. v. American Nat. Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952); N.L.R.B.
v, Insurance Agents' Int'l., 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
'19 Ross, THE LABOR LAW IN ACTION: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCESS UNDER TAFT-HARTLEY ACT, p. 27.
20Richfield Oil Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 231 F.2d 717 (D.C. Cir.) cert. denied, 351
U.S. 909 (1956).2IAllis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 213 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1954).
22 Franks Bros. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 321 U.S. 702 (1944).
23 N.L.R.B. v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344 (1953).
24 See Dodd, From Maximum Wages to Minimum Wages: Six Centuries of
Regulation of Employment Contracts, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 643, 675 (1943).
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According to the Porter case, the answer is "no." Despite contrary
trends, the policy deemed by the Court to be most worthy of ad-
vancement and to outweigh all other policy considerations remains
freedom of contract.
One of those "other policies" overshadowed by this decision is
that of the duty of the Board "to take such affirmative action ... as
will effectuate the policies" of the Act.26 The courts have generally
applied a "hands-off" doctrine in reviewing orders of the Board,27
acknowledging that the expertise gained by the Board through its
daily encounter with labor relations cases renders it a more com-
petent branch to deal with problems arising under the Act.28 It is
the Board which has been given the power to devise remedies to
undo the adverse effects of violations, 29 and the Board which has
been delegated the duty of "reconciling sometimes divergent in-
terests" in devising those remedies. ° The faith placed in that body
has been extended to the point where the Court has declared that
an order of the Board "should stand unless it can be shown that the
order is a patent attempt to achieve ends other than those which can
fairly be said to effectuate the policies of the Act." 3'
The question then arises as to whether the Board's action in
compelling a check-off provision actually did amount to such an
attempt so as to justify, on grounds other than freedom-of-contract
policy, the Court's intrusion into the Board's domain of "reconcil-
ing sometimes divergent interests" in the field of labor law con-
troversy.
Besides freedom of contract, policies intended to be advanced
by the Act include industrial peace,32 equalization of bargaining
power, 33 and curtailment of devices used to frustrate the collective
25 Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1401, 1403 (1958).
2629 U.S.C.A. § 160(c) (1965, Supp. 1970).
•- See N.L.R.B. v. Seven-Up Bottling Co. 344 U.S. 344 (1953); Fibreboard
Paper Products Co. v. N.L.R.B., 379 U.S. 203 (1964); N.L.R.B. v. J. H.
Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 396 U.S. 258 (1969).
"S As the Court has stated, where the Board, "in the exercise of its informed
discretion" has rendered a decision, the Court will "give considerable weight
to that administrative determination." Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. N.L.R.B.,
319 U.S. 533, 540 (1943). Summing up the Court's attitude, the Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit stated:
In fashioning remedies the Board is drawing on its peculiar expertise
and reservoir of informed judgment gained from continuous and inti-
mate study of labor relations problems. Because of this, courts must
pay special deference to the Board's choice of a remedy. . . . United
Steelworkers of America v. N.L.R.B., 376 F.2d 770, 772 (1967).
29 As the Court has stated, "One of the chief responsibilities of the Board is to
direct such action as will dissipate the unwholesome effects of violations of
the Act." Franks Bros. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 321 U.S. 702, 704 (1944).
30 United Steelworkers of America v. N.L.R.B., 376 F.2d 770, 773 (1967).
31 Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. N.L.R.B., 319 U.S. 533, 540 (1943).
32 Fibreboard Paper Products Co. v. N.L.R.B., 379 U.S. 203, 211 (1964).
33 79 Cong. Rec. 7658 (1935) (remarks of Senator Walsh).
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bargaining process. 34 By compelling agreement to the check-off pro-
vision, it can well be argued that the Board promoted industrial
peace through prevention of an unfair-labor-practice strike, the
threat of which is ever-present when prolonged negotiations, ham-
pered by violations of the duty to bargain in good faith, prove fruit-
less. It can also be well maintained that the Board's action did
equalize the bargaining power of the parties, making more mean-
ingful the company's duty to negotiate with the obviously over-
powered union, which had already conceded ten of the eleven issues
actually resolved.3 5 And it is beyond doubt that the order of the
Board would have prevented the company from frustrating the
making of any contract, because it removed from negotiation the issue
which had obstructed the reaching of an agreement. Thus, since the
Board's order did achieve intended goals, it cannot rightfully be
attacked as an attempt to achieve other ends than those which
would effectuate the Act's policies.
Further, the Board's order cannot be criticized as violating the
court's mandate against devising remedies which are punitive in
nature,36 since its purpose was not to punish the company but rather
to "make meaningful this fundamental right of employees" 37 to conduct
labor negotiations.
What this suggests is that, when confronted with conflicting
policy decisions, the Court will make that choice which best ad-
vances the doctrine of freedom of contract, it being the Court's
opinion that our present national labor policy is at a stage which
still demands the precedence of this policy over all others. With all
due deference owed to the expertise of the Board, the Court will
not as yet stand aside when it witnesses an act which it considers
to be an overextension of power and in contravention of the policy
forwarded by the Court itself.
Whether the freedom-of-contract doctrine espoused by the Court
in the Porter case will remain the policy most vigorously advanced
depends upon the success of the Board in coping with the recal-
citrant employer determined to defeat the effectiveness of the Act.
The ineffectiveness of the Board's remedies, already the object of
widespread criticism,38 may in the future necessitate emphasis upon
34 Id.
35 United Steelworkers of America v. N.L.R.B. 389 F.2d 295, 297 (1967).
36 For a decision holding that punitive remedies are prohibited, see Consolidated
Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197 (1938).
37United Steelworkers of America v. N.L.R.B., 389 F.2d 295, 301 (1967).
3s Aware of the limited scope of the Board's power to effectively eliminate cir-
cumvention of the N.L.R.A., the Chairman of the N.L.R.B. has commented:
There may be no single reason for this steep rise in Section 8(a) (5)
cases during the last decade, but a number of objective observers believe
that a major explanation is that the Board's traditional remedies are
19711
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upon other policy considerations. At the present time, however, free-
dom of contract reigns, susceptible to dethronement by Congres-
sional action alone.
LEAH M. LAMPONE
not sufficiently effective to encourage voluntary compliance with this
important part of our law. In recent years, Committees of the Congress,
the courts, as well as labor law scholars have expressed concern that
the Board's refusal-to-bargain remedies may be inadequate to achieve
the purposes of the Act. McCulloch, Past, Present and Future Remedies
Under Section 8(a)(5) of the N.L.R.A., 19 LAB. L. J. 131, 133 (1968).
Also aware of this deficiency, Philip Ross has written:
The major shortcoming of the N.L.R.B. lies in its failure to adopt ade-
quate and realistic remedies in those cases where the employer has un-
mistakenly demonstrated a continuing intent to frustrate the Act.
Drotning and Lipsky, The Effectiveness of Reinstatement as a Public
Policy Remedy: The Kohler Case, 22 IND. & LAa. REL. REv. 179 (1969).
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